Sylvain Rouleau, Toronto
On February 17, 2012 the Supreme Court of Canada
ruled on the latest challenge by parents to religious freedom and education.
In S.L. and
D.J. and Commission scolaire des Chênes and Attorney General of Quebec the
Supreme Court of Canada was asked to decide whether or not the Province’s
Ethics and Religious Culture (“ERC”) Program, which became mandatory in Quebec
schools in 2008, infringed on S.L. and D.J.’s right to freedom of religion.
S.L. and D.J., two parents of school aged children
attending a public school, sought to have their children made exempt from the
ERC Program, because they believed that the ERC Program interfered with their
obligation to pass on their Catholic faith to their children and caused their
children to question their faith at an age when they should be following
parental direction in matters of religion.
The Supreme Court of Canada applied a well
established two part test to determine whether or not the Province infringed
upon the parents’ right to freedom of religion.
The first step of the test is subjective and requires the person to
demonstrate they have a sincerely held religious belief. The second part of the test requires the
person to demonstrate that this belief has been infringed by state action.
The Supreme Court of Canada accepted that S.L. and
D.J. sincerely held religious beliefs.
However, the Court was unanimous in its decision that there was no
evidence that the ERC Program had interfered with those sincerely held
beliefs. In other words, the parents did
not prove that the ERC Program interfered with their obligation to pass on
their Catholic faith to their children nor did they demonstrate
that the ERC Program caused their children to question their faith at an age
when they should be following parental direction in such matters.
The Supreme Court of Canada commented that the concept
of state religious neutrality has grown out of the multicultural makeup of
Canada and a need to protect minorities.
The goal is to permit all religions to exist and practice their beliefs
without being stymied by governmental institutions. The Court commented that such an objective is
achieved when the state neither favours nor hinders any particular religious
belief, when it shows respect for all religions as well as respect for the
decision not to hold any religious beliefs, and takes into account competing
rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada found that the ERC
Program was neutral in its teachings about religion, morals and ethics and that
the Program espoused universal truths.
However, the parents who sought to have their children made exempt from
the Program argued that the obligation to teach morals, ethics and universal
truths, was their religious duty. They
have since removed their children from the public school system and placed them
in a private Catholic school, which has been exempted from the ERC Program.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in S.L. and D.J. and Commission scolaire des
Chênes and Attorney General of Quebec and specifically, its application of
the second part of the legal test regarding infringement of freedom of religion
as it applies to educational programming, might have a significant impact on
education. For example, the Ontario
Government’s Bill 13, Accepting Schools
Act, and the Government’s previous attempts to create curriculum regarding
sexual education have faced criticism on the basis of freedom of religion. The present case suggests that the Supreme
Court of Canada will require significant evidence demonstrating interference
with religious beliefs in order to find that the right to religious freedom has
been impeded.
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Gillian Tuck Kutarna, Guelph
The Ontario
College of Teachers ("College") recently announced that it has hired
retired Justice Patrick LeSage to undertake a comprehensive review of its
disciplinary process, to be completed by May 2012.
Education Minister Laurel Broten has also introduced
reforms, including an examination of the College’s current dispute resolution
policies and processes, which allow teachers to negotiate a plea along with the
terms of their penalty. In the interim,
effective January 4, 2012, sexual offences will be specifically ineligible for
dispute resolution, and the College must publish all of its disciplinary
decisions on its website.
A review of two 2011 decisions of the College's Discipline
Committee, may suggest some of the impetus
behind these developments.
The Case of Massimilano Silvio
Tallarico
The
decision in this case was based on a ‘Statement
of Uncontested Facts, Pleas of No Contest, and Joint Submission on Penalty’. The member agreed to admit the allegation of
professional misconduct based on failing to maintain the standards of the
profession, and committing acts which would reasonably be regarded as
disgraceful, dishonourable and unprofessional.
In exchange for this admission, all allegations of abuse of students,
and in particular sexual abuse, were withdrawn by the College.
The
Discipline Committee accepted both the reduced list of allegations and the
statement of uncontested facts, which included an acknowledgement that the
member “engaged in an inappropriate relationship with the student”. They also adopted the joint submission on
penalty, and so imposed the following sanctions:
- a reprimand by the College; and
- completion of an approved course on appropriate boundaries and boundary
violation issues, taught by a provider who had reviewed the Decision of the
Committee and joint submissions of the parties.
The
College was not prepared to agree that the teacher’s name should be withheld in
the College’s quarterly publication of Professionally
Speaking, arguing that a public record served as a deterrent.
However, the Committee disagreed and would
not publish the member’s name, stating that the member had been
sufficiently
‘reprimanded’ and upon completion of the course on boundaries, would be
‘rehabilitated’. The Committee’s Order and findings could be
published in summary form only, with no mention of the member’s name. In
its
reasons, the Discipline Committee described their decision as providing a
“general and specific deterrent”, and the “transparency and openness
required
by the public”.
The Case of Richard Donald Lorne
Burdett
Mr.
Burdett, like his colleague Mr. Tallarico, submitted a Statement of Uncontested Facts, Plea of No Contest and Joint Submission
on Penalty.
In
admitting to the allegation of Professional Misconduct, Mr. Burdett
acknowledged being guilty of sexual abuse of a student or students as defined
by Sections 1 and 40(1.1) of the Ontario
College of Teachers Act, 1996.
The
joint submission on penalty was adopted in its entirety by the Committee. It included:
- a reprimand by the College;
- suspension of his Certificate for 12 months, commencing February 3,
2011. However, the suspension would be
lifted for the latter 6 months, that is, by August 31, 2011, if by that date,
(a) Mr. Burdett completed a pre-approved course on appropriate boundaries
and boundary violation issues, taught by a provider who had reviewed the
Decision of the Committee and joint submissions of the parties; and
(b) Successfully underwent treatment with a registered psychological
therapist who had also reviewed the Committee’s decision and joint submissions
of the parties, and certified that they had examined him and he posed no “undue
risk to students”.
- Mr. Burdett would fulfill the above requirements before returning to
work as a teacher; and
- Mr. Burdett would take all reasonable steps to ensure that he received a
performance appraisal within two years of returning to work, reporting the
results to the Registrar of the College.
The
Committee supported the College’s submission that the member’s name be
published in Professionally Speaking. It held that this, along with the other
“severe penalties” it had imposed, would demonstrate that the Committee “treats
matters of this nature very seriously”.
Minister
Broten has stated that her Ministry will be paying particular attention to
Justice LeSage’s recommendations with regards to the establishment of possible
mandatory penalties for specific types of misconduct, such as sexual offences,
and the circumstances under which a member’s name may be withheld.
Although
we will never know, because the details of the alleged misconduct have not been
released, it would be an interesting exercise to compare the outcomes in these
two cases with the outcomes of cases after reforms are made. As revised policies and processes are
unveiled, we will watch for features that support greater transparency, and we
will assess whether there may be a shift away from the historical focus on
rehabilitation of members, as demonstrated in the cases reviewed here, to discipline.
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Nadya Tymochenko, Toronto
The Ontario
Labour Relations Board ("OLRB") recently put to rest the question of whether or not changes to the Occupational Health
and Safety Act brought about by Bill 168 also changed the OLRB’s authority
to supervise employers with respect to issues of employee harassment. In
another recent decision, the OLRB provided some guidance in obiter about
behaviour that would not be sufficient to be considered harassment.
Recently, the
OLRB found that it does not have jurisdiction to act pursuant to section 50 of
the Occupational Health and Safety Act
("OHSA") when an employee alleges an
employer has breached the Act by failing to properly respond to an allegation
of harassment. In the case before the
OLRB, an employee alleged that following harassment by her co-workers she filed
a complaint, which she alleged her employer failed to investigate. As well, the employee argued that her
employer failed to properly process her WSIB application.
The OLRB found
that section 50 of the OHSA, which
identifies specific jurisdiction for some workplace reprisal allegations, does
not equally apply to allegations that an employer has failed to address an
allegation of harassment. The OLRB held
that the new provisions added by Bill 168 specifically omit an obligation by an
employer to prevent workplace harassment or to keep the workplace free of
harassment, and as such, section 50 of the OHSA
cannot be engaged by the employee.
Moreover, the OLRB found that the OHSA
only requires that an employer put in place a policy and inform its employees
about that policy the OHSA imposes no other duties on employers with respect to workplace harassment. The OLRB held that it had no authority to
adjudicate on the application of an employer’s policy regarding harassment,
including how it might investigate or act during its investigation results.
While it would
appear that the OLRB does not have authority with respect to allegations that
employers have failed to implement or comply with workplace harassment
policies, it is possible that an employee could argue that the harassment had
so impacted their work and workplace as to cause their constructive dismissal.
As a result of the decision, the OLRB is unlikely to provide a great deal of direction on harassment. Previously, however, the OLRB had an opportunity to
provide some guidance regarding what behaviour will not constitute
harassment. In a case involving a
teacher alleging reprisal by his employer and failure to properly address
harassment allegations, the OLRB found that it did not need to determine if it
had jurisdiction pursuant to section 50 of the OHSA to deal with the complaint, because the allegations of
harassment were not in fact harassment.
Namely, the
teacher alleged that a fellow teacher’s: teaching methods and style; tardiness;
lack of attention to matters of student health and safety during lab work;
gossip about another teacher; refusal to meet to discuss departmental issues;
confrontation about criticisms made of her as a teacher; and shouting at the
teacher to turn off the lights during the course of a meeting, were harassing.
The OLRB found
that these allegations were not harassment as defined by the OHSA, “[H]arassment
under the OHSA is defined as engaging in a course of vexatious comment or
conduct against a worker in a workplace that is known or ought reasonably to be
known to be unwelcome”. The OLRB found
that most of the allegations were not related to or directed at the teacher,
save one confrontation and one request to turn out the lights, which the OLRB
found could not be considered a course of vexatious comment or conduct toward
the teacher.
School boards
will have to wait for further direction from grievance arbitration cases to
have a full picture of what will be considered harassment.
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Ana Simoes, Articling Student, Toronto
A recent B.C. Court of Appeal decision held that the
B.C. Teachers’ Federation could not require school boards to establish and
enforce student codes of conduct through the collective agreement because they
were never negotiated between the parties.
By Ministerial Order, the Ministry of Education made
it mandatory for school boards to establish and enforce student codes of
conduct in consultation with employees, parents and others. But, following a survey which showed that
many districts had not complied with their obligations, the Teachers’
Federation grieved, alleging that the school boards had violated and continued
to violate their collective agreement provisions by failing to comply with the
Ministry of Education’s requirement to establish and enforce student codes of
conduct. The school boards argued that the matter was neither grievable nor
arbitrable.
The arbitrator found that the core of the grievance
was to ensure school boards established student codes of conduct in compliance
with the Ministry of Education’s requirements. The arbitrator also found that,
although there was similarity between the Ministry of Education’s student code
of conduct requirements and matters that had been pursued in collective
bargaining by the Teachers’ Federation, student codes of conduct had never been
negotiated between the parties, making it “difficult to equate them to a
significant part of the employment relationship.”
Further, although the School Act and regulations were, absent to the contrary, made a
term or condition of a teacher’s contract of employment, the arbitrator found
that it did not make student codes of conduct a term or condition of the
teachers’ collective agreement.
The decision of the arbitrator was judicially
reviewed on the standard of correctness and further appealed to the B.C. Court
of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal agreed that the standard of
review was correctness, because the Ministerial Order of the Ministry of
Education was law of general application and not within specialized
jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The Court of Appeal found that the Ministerial
Order was not subject to arbitration because it dealt with consequences for students and there was nothing in the
Order or in the School Act expressly
importing it into teachers’ collective agreements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the arbitrator that
the requirement to establish and implement student codes of conduct, as
required by the Ministerial Order, was not employment-related, but was rather
focused on student safety. The Court of
Appeal found that, while the Ministerial Order, did benefit teachers by
fostering a safe, caring environment and prohibiting certain types of discrimination
that was not sufficient to make it employment-related legislation so as to vest
enforcement authority in a grievance arbitrator.
In Ontario, codes of conduct are also required of
school boards, and some local agreements have provisions specifically speaking
to codes of conduct, their application and/or amendment.
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